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TRADITIONAL PARADIGMS FOR THE CAUSES OF WAR
APPLIED TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM:




Inquiry into the set of possible relationships between trade and peace
is not a new object of study. Indeed, it is one of the oldest questions of
human existence. While it is not a question that permits a final answer,
it is, nonetheless, a question that requires continuing reflection. Indeed,
how we have considered the question in the past may well be more
interesting 'and useful than the current state of progress in developing
empirically valid propositions on the subject. That said, it may be that,
at this stage, further progress in developing propositions amenable to
empirical testing and validation may depend on developing a sharper
understanding of what we mean by the relationship between trade and
peace. Perhaps we should instead reflect more on how we have thought
about the question, in the hope that doing so would yield some insight
for how we should consider it in the future. In a sense, all I want to argue
is that what we mean by trade and peace might well be "undiscovered
country" 1 for constructing a useful research paradigm in the 21 st Century.
Even so, one should not have too much hope, for as Hegel wrote: "The
owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk.
' 2
The first object of this paper, therefore, is to consider in very general
terms the intellectual history of the study of the relation between trade
and peace, using two key texts from the beginning and the end of the
Cold War - first, Kenneth Waltz's "Man, the State, and War: A
Theoretical Analysis" 3; and, second, Philip Bobbitt's "The Shield of
Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History."4 Waltz's work served
as the authoritative survey of the foundational principles for the study
of international relations theory during the greater part of the era, and
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as this essay will develop further, the paradigms he fashioned mapped
later theoretical developments in the field. Bobbitt's more recent work,
as this essay will also further develop, is the most ambitious theoretical
alternative to Waltz's paradigms currently available. Each author's at-
tempt to grapple with the relationship between trade and war is the
central question motivating their theoretical projects. Analysis of these
two seminal texts serves as a vehicle for articulating the changing features
of the study of the relation between trade and peace across this era.
More important, to the extent one can superimpose Bobbitt's categories
on the framework designed by Waltz, notwithstanding the half-century
gap between them, the two works compel us to look behind their analyses
for common, unanswered questions relevant to the relationship of trade
and peace, which in turn could form the basis for future research that
transcends the assumptions and peculiarities of the conditions giving
rise to, and bringing about the end of, the Cold War, for which these
two works serve as bookends.
That said, because Waltz and Bobbitt's works cannot be understood
as merely descriptive - either in the case of Waltz's attempt to organize
theoretical analysis of the sources of war or in the case of Bobbitt's
effort to report on the nature and function of war in modem human
history - any analytical benefits that might be derived from attempting
to synthesize their work should be discounted to the extent those catego-
ries and methods are driven by the normative commitments of the authors.
We always need to ask whether those normative commitments serve
underlying values, making their theoretical and nominally descriptive
work rather a form of implicit advocacy. Therefore, the second part of
this paper will argue that Waltz's normative commitments are revealed
in the order of his presentation and Bobbitt's normative commitments
are revealed in the ostensibly descriptive thesis he advances concerning
the triumph of the so-called market state. Furthermore, both normative
commitments may be said to formulate the question of the relation
between trade and peace in revealing ways: For Waltz, the question is,
what causes war? For Bobbitt, the question is, what causes peace?
The third part of this paper asks how we should formulate the question
of the relation between war and peace, and it will argue that, until we
make distinctions that are explicitly normative in character about the
moral significance of different modes of "free" trade or "protectionism"
and different modes of "peace" and "war," it will be inevitable that
nominally descriptive analysis will be distorted by hidden normative
premises. Accordingly, building on the premises revealed in Waltz and
Bobbitt's work, Part IV of this paper argues that a fuller account of the
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nature of market society and its implications for human behavior at
individual, community, and global levels of interaction is necessary
before a useful research program on the relation between trade and war
can be constructed.
II. Recurring Analytical Paradigms at the Beginning and End of
the Cold War
In the early days of the Cold War, Waltz advanced the so-called three-
image paradigm.5 The so-called first image seeks to explain international
violence through the normal operation of certain posited characteristics
of human nature - such as a natural instinct for self-preservation yielding
rational egoism or, as its theologically-tinged counterpart, the sin of
pride - drawing on the work of Spinoza and St. Augustine, together
with their modern secular and religious counterparts, Morganthau and
Niebuhr.6 The diagnosis of the disease giving rise to war, in Waltz's
view, invited a series of responses directed toward the management of
human behavior - seeking the moderation of aggressive instincts -
as the appropriate remedy for the disease.7 Because this first-image
analysis did not make Waltz confident that all the causes of international
violence could be eliminated, Waltz then suggested that a second-image
for diagnosis was required, one at the level of the domestic institutions
of states and focusing largely on liberal thought (including the liberal
agenda of peace through trade, largely as the fruit of limited government)
.8 Yet, as Waltz showed, the second-image analysis implied for many
the need for a socialist agenda of transforming the internal structure of
states to remedy the war-causing defects of liberal capitalism. 9 The
failures of second-image remedies prescribed by Marxian and Leninist
physicians - namely, the concentration of private capital through the
normal operation of the market economy, leading in turn to the capture
of governmental policy by private capital, and consequential adoption
of imperialist and inevitably war-provoking policies by those govern-
ments - led Waltz to posit yet another analytical approach, the so-
called third image. Drawing on Thucydides and Rousseau, Waltz focused
on the strategic conditions of the system of states, which he termed
"international anarchy." 10 As Waltz morosely summarized: the "obvi-
ous conclusion of a third-image analysis is that world government is
the remedy for world war. The remedy, though it may be unassailable
in logic, is unattainable in practice."" In sum, Waltz's analytical project
confesses prescriptive failure.
One could argue that Waltz's three-image theory has given rise to the
three dominant schools of current international relations theory: social
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constructivism, liberal institutionalism, and realism. Social constructiv-
ism, like the first-image, explains the conflicts of interest between states
largely in terms of the value choices embedded in individual and commu-
nity conceptions of self-identity. Liberal institutionalism, like the second
image, focuses on the creation of international institutions that replicate
at the international level the coordinating functions of the modem state.
Finally, neo-realism, like the third image, views conflict as flowing
necessarily from the fact of strategic competition. Still, Waltz's para-
digms remain relevant and should supply a point of departure in devel-
oping a research agenda for the study of the interaction between trade
and international violence; but the central role of the state in Waltz's
subsequent work clarifies that the relationship of second-image explana-
tions to both the first- and third-image perspectives is at the heart of his
analysis. 12 However, Waltz's focus on the second-image, liberal para-
digm and its relation to the third image generally endorses, albeit in a
qualified way, the liberal agenda of peace through trade.13 Waltz's posi-
tion on this question thus forms a starting point for post-Cold War
analysis, a fact that is reflected in the important contribution of Philip
Bobbitt to the study of international law and international relations theory
in "The Shield of Achilles."
Methodologically and substantively, Bobbitt clearly is in dialogue with
Waltz, albeit in opposition as well. In terms of methodology, Bobbitt -
in a self-conscious effort to reorient international relations theory -
purports to argue that causality in war is better understood through
a primarily second-image analysis, in which the nature of domestic
constitutional law - namely, the central principles that legitimize that
state and serve as the touchstone for normative argument, such as federal-
ism in the pre-Civil War U.S. constitutional system - drives the interna-
tional system; to be precise, Bobbitt claims that the international system
is now being driven in a direction conducive to the flourishing of states
whose legitimacy will henceforth be grounded on maximizing individual
opportunity. 14 That said, Bobbitt insists that history (through the mecha-
nism of human choice) and objective conditions (such as technological
change) matter also. He thus maintains that his account of the relation
between history, constitutional law, and international strategy is neither
uni-directional nor mono-causal.
15
In substance, Bobbitt asserts we are witnessing an emerging struggle
between the quasi-libertarian (that is to say, U.S.), quasi-welfarist (that
is to say, European) and quasi-mercantilist (that is to say, Japanese)
versions of a new kind of state, the market-state - namely, a state or
organization, including oddly enough Al Qaeda, dedicated to the pursuit
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of the "opportunity" of its members to fulfill their aspirations. This
forthcoming era of competition is merely the latest in a series of epochal
wars in which different forms of the state engaged in death struggles, with
the seeds of the next epochal war sown in the internal transformations that
yielded victory in the last epochal struggle; and Bobbitt maintains that this
competition will constitute the next epochal war involving international
armed conflict, though not necessarily in the form of the pitched battles
that have characterized most wars.16 It was the nation-state form, he
argues, that dominated international politics during the long war between
modern fascism, communism, and liberal democracy. The nation-state
form, he suggests, was committed to national welfare, which enabled it
to mobilize the large conscript armies and industrial production that
proved decisive in the epochal struggle that culminated in the First
World War, in which the nation-state form of constitutional legitimacy
(furthering the welfare of a people) triumphed over the older state-
nations, such as the first German Empire, in which the state's legitimacy
was grounded in its capacity to create a nation. 17 The nation-state will
largely disappear, prophesizes Bobbitt, and the market-state will become
the dominant model for governance in this century. Following the Second
World War, it was domestic constitutional innovations in the United
States, Europe and Japan - favoring the furthering of individual opportu-
nity and creativity over collective social welfare - that enabled them
better to harness the communications, nuclear and information-pro-
cessing revolutions. This competitive advantage in turn enabled these
liberal-democratic nation-states to prevail in the long war among the
other competing versions of the nation state, but in that process they
were transformed into a new form of the state, the market-state, based
on a new principle of legitimacy, the maximization of opportunity of
the market-state's citizens or members.
18
Bobbitt's theory tracks Waltz's approach in some ways and deviates in
others. The independent significance of the three explanatory variables -
history through human choice, constitutional law shaping and being
shaped by the state, and strategic considerations reflected in international
anarchy - clearly correspond to Waltz's three-image analysis of the
sources of war. Unlike Waltz, however, Bobbitt does not consider war
a disease requiring diagnosis and remedy; it is rather, for Bobbitt, a fact,
whose role is an inescapable part of the evolution of human life in
organized communities called states. 19 Thus, B obbitt's descriptive claim
is that the new post-Cold War international order reflects a struggle
between three versions of the so-called market state - a struggle that
has a beginning and, no doubt, will have an end. The analysis is dynamic
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and, in the words of one critic, "Hegelian," 20 although - as I will
explain below - Bobbitt himself would probably be horrified at the
suggestion that his theory supposes that one can discern the final purposes
of human history.
2 1
While Bobbitt's analysis does not supply more than an outline for a
research program into the exact relationships between the shape of the
international trade system, each of the variants he hypothesizes for the
market state could serve as building blocks for a descriptive research
program. The three real-world types of market states might facilitate
unpacking the concept of trade itself in terms of three competing stands,
or conceptions of trade, as ideal types for analysis of the current interna-
tional legal system. At one end of the spectrum would be a core, entrepre-
neurial/libertarian conception; a protectionist, possibly mercantilist, man-
aged trade version - designed to protect domestic, status quo values -
would stand at the other end of the spectrum; and, at an intermediate
position, one might describe a welfarist effort to balance libertarian
values against communitarian social values. One might then begin to
consider the degree to which these three versions of trade policy, dictated
by the internal constitutional structures of the three competing versions
of the market-state shaped the international trading system as a whole.
Perhaps the entrepreneurial/libertarian component of international trade
law would facilitate individual access to global markets and seek to
restrain rent-seeking behavior by interest groups mediated through na-
tional and international governance structures. Or maybe the welfarist
strand of free trade policy would advance individual market access and
economic efficiency of national markets. But this tendency might be
constrained by strong limits on the effects of free trade that conflict with
non-pecuniary values and social virtues, namely trust and solidarity,
which are arguably manifested in labor rights and environmental values
and sometimes entail limited protection of certain sectors of the national
economy from international competition. The mercantilist strand, by
contrast to the libertarian and welfarist approaches, might subordinate
individual rights to national interests in pecuniary and non-pecuniary
gains, protecting strategically significant sectors of the national economy
from international competition.
One could then envision the interaction between trade policy and
international violence in terms of a matrix, suggesting possible sub-
questions for analysis of the effects of different trade regimes. On one
side of a matrix, one might consider the three Waltzian images, moving
top-down from nature of the individual, to state system structure, to
international system structure. Against this side of the matrix, one could
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posit different conceptions of trade for the market state. Conclusions
with respect to the most fruitful areas for further research could be
drawn on the basis of reconfiguring research questions in terms of the
relationships between different conceptions of the market state and the
three Waltzian images:
Image\Trade Entrepreneurial Welfarist Mercantilist
Human Entrepreneurs/ Welfarists/ Mercantilists/
Agency Libertarians Communitarians Statists
Domestic Entrepreneurial Welfarist Mercantilist
Constitutional Market States Market States Market States
Structure
International Entrepreneurial Welfarist Mercantilist
Anarchy International International International
Anarchy Anarchy Anarchy
The questions such a research program could generate range across the
matrix of possibilities, such as: whether, in terms of the entrepreneurial
trade located in the context of international anarchy, the formation of
transnational elites committed to free trade move international politics
in the direction of peaceful dispute resolution; within the framework of
welfarist trade viewed from the optic of domestic constitutional structure,
whether the rent-seeking and protectionist behaviors permitted by the
welfarist model complicate domestic and transnational governments by
facilitating capture of national and international security policies by
interest groups; and, framed as a question analyzing the relationship
between mercantilist trade and human agency, whether national mercan-
tilist orientation encourages nationalist conceptions of exceptionalism
that increase the likelihood of public support for aggressive international
policies.
Ultimately, one could examine the degree to which each of these
possible ideal types characterizes the existing international trade regime,
principally the World Trade Organization, and the prospects for its future
development. It might then permit a more considered assessment of the
recent Sutherland Commission Report, which advances a conception of
the WTO and a reform agenda that draws largely on a purely intergovern-
mental conception of free trade. 22 Bobbitt, in this connection, argues
that nation-state institutions, such as the WTO, will become increasingly
less important in the new international environment.
23
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III. Normative Commitments Embedded in Waltz and Bobbitt
It may be that the current WTO reflects a set of normative commitments
to national welfare maximization that are characteristic of the nation-
state. Yet, organizing research on the relationship between trade and
peace in terms of the three images suggested by Waltz and the competing
versions of the market state Bobbitt posits also may well presuppose a
set of undisclosed normative commitments. We should therefore try to
understand the underlying rhetorical strategy embedded in both "Man,
the State and War" and "The Shield of Achilles." Waltz begins with
the question of "why is there war?" Moving from human nature, to
state systems, to international systems, he advances a determinist ethic
that minimizes human responsibility and moral accountability; perhaps,
although this is only speculation, his views express a form of rebellion
against the ethical theory that might have caused the U.S. to be isolationist
during the inter-war period; that ethical theory supposed the existence
of a conception of "international morality" forming the basis for "inter-
national public opinion" that would largely enforce international peace.24
Waltz's three-image analysis is thus a precursor to his formal presentation
of structural realism nearly two decades later as a systematic theory of
international politics.
2 5
Bobbitt, by contrast, begins with the assumption that there will be war
and asks "How does peace come about?", providing the answer that
peace is a temporary condition that constitutes the fruit of victory in
an epochal war settling the fundamental constitutional issues facing
international society, at least until new issues arise. He thus move rhetori-
cally from the other direction - beginning with the international strategic
context, moving to the domestic constitutional law that explains the
innovations that yield victory, but describing the role of key historical
actors whose choices in history yield victory. As much as Waltz's three-
image analysis foreshadowed his later theory of international politics,
Bobbitt's study of strategy, law and history flows directly from his earlier
work on constitutional law and social policy, which reflect the pursuit
of an understanding of how values are revealed by human choice at
every level of human decision-making. 26 In sum, both Waltz and Bobbitt
advance underlying conceptions of the role of human choice in history -
admittedly in pale shadows of the deeper debate between the Tolstoyan
and the Great Man theories of history.
27
IV. Reflections on the Market-State and Human Nature
If the market state has become the dominant kind of state, and will
serve as the basis for the next international order, study of the relation
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between trade and war should then focus on the common, underlying
question that concerned Waltz and Bobbitt. The next research paradigm
needs to go back, as Bobbitt's own existential commitments seem to
require, to a search of a deeper understanding of human nature. More
specifically, if both Waltz and Bobbitt, implicitly or explicitly, advance
a view of the scope of human agency in determining the causes of war
and peace, then serious reflection on their arguments, applied to the
question of the relation between trade and peace, needs to sharpen its
understanding of the relation between human agency and trade. Clearly,
the research matrix presented in this paper suggests further exploration
of the ways in which different views of trade can foster, or flow from,
different understandings of human nature.
An initial effort to explore those relationships could draw on the work
of Albert Hirschman, who -just as Waltz a half-century ago purported to
describe the intellectual history of the theory of the causes of international
violence - attempted a quarter-century later to describe the competing
visions of the effect of market life on human behavior.
28 Hirschman,
near the mid-point of the period framed by Waltz and Bobbitt, focused
on the competing historical conceptions of the effect of the market on
human behavior, democracy and peace. The central dichotomy he drew,
at least for purposes of this essay,29 is between the so-called sweet or
"doux-commerce" thesis and the so-called "self-destruction" thesis,
which developed in opposition to each other as though in intellectual
debate carried on since the emergence of modem capitalism.
Developing first, the "doux-commerce" thesis - long associated with
the thought of Montesquieu, David Hume and Adam Smith - argues
that market society is conducive to good manners, opposition to violence,
frugality, punctuality, and probity.30 According to Hirschman, the self-
destruction thesis emerged as thinkers on the left and right rebelled
against this vision of market society: with Marx, on one hand, arguing
that the internal logic of capitalism would bring about "an ever-more
numerous and more class-conscious and combative proletariat"; while,
on the other side, conservatives such as Bolingbroke feared that "all
social bonds were dissolved through money.',
31
Hirschman then drew attention to various formulations of the self-
destruction hypothesis: including Schumpeter's "creative destruction"
formulation 32; Horkheimer's Frankfurt School neo-Marxist formulation
that reason in Western civilization was destroying the intellectual and
cultural basis for that civilization's existence 33; and the game-theoretic
account of the prevalence of self-interested behavior in strategic interac-
tions popularized by the Prisoners' Dilemma.34 Finally, in response to
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these self-destruction thesis attacks, Hirschman described the recent
counter-attack of the doux-commerce thesis. Durkheim, for example,
drew attention to the possibility that, in the division of labor's replace-
ment of the common consciousness that held together primitive societies,
"a decisive role was played by many often unintended ties that people
take on or fall into in the wake of market transactions and contractual
commitments." 35 Thus, social solidarity could be achieved, much as the
Invisible Hand would create greater welfare, through entirely un-chosen
processes. Additionally, Hirschman pointed to Simmel's observation that
"the advanced division of labor in modem society, and the importance
of credit for the functioning of the economy, rest on, and promote, a
high degree of truthfulness in social relations." 36 In short, Hirschman
identified sufficient causal chains on both sides of the question to leave
any dispassionate reader in doubt as to whether the doux-commerce
or self-destruction thesis had prevailed, and research on the question
continues.
37
While Bobbitt clearly favors the self-actualizing opportunities made
available in the market state, he arguably should be classified as a
member of the "self-destruction thesis" camp. He framed the central
issue of the rise of the market-state explicitly in terms of the self-
destruction thesis, arguing as follows:
The central point in recognizing the emergence of the market-state
is ... to emphasize the importance of developing public goods-
such as loyalty, civility, trust in authority, respect for family life,
reverence for sacrifice, regard for privacy, admiration for political
competence-that the market, unaided is not well adapted to creating
and maintaining. The market-state has to produce public goods be-
cause that is precisely what the market will not do. This need for
qualities of reciprocity, solidarity, even decent manners domestically,
mirrors the need for collective goods, internationally, and thus repre-
sents not only a challenge but an opportunity for leadership. 38
Like the tragic poets he so admires, Bobbitt appears to believe that it is
the very strength of the market-state - its capacity to advance individual
opportunities to achieve excellence - which undermines its capacity
to produce the other virtues that make life in community tolerable. Yet
his rhetoric returns to the centrality of existential self-actualization, given
the freedom of the human spirit and the possibility for prudent choice.
Obviously, Bobbitt believes that men and women capable of making
such choices exist.
Still, any theory grounded in this variable is less a theory than an
article of faith. It would be better to unpack and test the assumptions
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that market society always undermines solidarity and induces selfishness
or always encourages magnanimity and gentility, at any particular level
of human governance. Waltz's own ambivalent posture towards the
effects of tariff reduction - in increasing the welfare of many, though
not necessarily all states, or at least increasing their welfare at different
rates39 - hints at the tension between the natural desire to excel, without
regard to the success of others, and envious will that measures success
only in relative terms. Bobbitt's account of the psychology of heroism -
in a book paying homage to the proudest of Greek warriors - is, to
say the least, incomplete. What kind of international trade then would
be fit for the Achilles whom Bobbitt imagines will shape the future of
the international trade regime? We do not know. But would not one
instead prefer to narrow the circumstances in which a call for the heroic
would be the only remaining answer in the eternal quest to avoid war?
V. Summary and Conclusion
21 st century scholarship needs to respect the wisdom of the greatest
teachers of the last century. Let me express my continuing admiration
for Waltz, who makes critical contributions to the study of the causes
of war. The research program generated by Waltz a half-century ago is
of enduring significance. The three images give us a useful second-order
language to discuss different analysis of the human condition, the nature
of states, the role of international trade, and the shape of international
society. But Waltz gives us a static mode of analysis, while Bobbitt
begins to rectify that deficiency by reintroducing history, making us pay
more attention to change. On the other hand, Waltz and Bobbitt do not
start from the same place: while Waltz assumes that war breaks out,
Bobbitt takes it as the natural condition of mankind. Yet, both assump-
tions about human nature need to be unpacked and tested against reality.
Accordingly, in analyzing one dimension of human sociability, life in
the market, we need to explore different starting points in understanding
the nature of market society - perhaps as a forum for international
cooperation under the so-called doux-commerce thesis; alternatively,
as a vehicle for international self-immolation under the so-called self-
destruction thesis - in Hirschman's spirit of dispassionate inquiry. In
short, if we are, as Bobbitt argues, at the end of an international era and
the beginning of a new one, it is only now that we can see the "owl of
Minerva spread her wings." Certainly, we want to see her and track her
flight. Our hopes will do little good if we're looking for her with bad
lenses or if we're not looking in the right direction. Both good lenses
(that is to say, Waltz's images) and knowing where to look (that is to
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say, Bobbitt's understanding that good history incorporates the element
of human freedom to choose our individual and collective destinies) will
be necessary if we are to follow the owl of Minerva's flight.
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